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Abstract 
During the nineties, Rwandan households had to cope with severe shocks of war and 
genocide. In addition, two major structural problems in Rwanda, land scarcity and 
declining soil fertility, remain unsolved. How do Rwandan households manage? This is 
an important question from a development perspective, but also from a security 
perspective, because uneven development increases the risk of peace collapse. To find an 
answer to our question, we study welfare gains and losses of a sample of 189 Rwandan 
rural households over the period 1990-2002. In our sample, many households were 
severely affected by the genocide. In addition, poverty and inequality increased. 
Moreover, we observe a lot of income mobility. Only one quarter of the households 
remained in the same income quintile over time. Especially the households headed by 
widows and prisoner’s wives moved downward in the income distribution. Households 




In this paper we study income mobility of rural household in Rwanda between 1990 and 
2002. Rwanda is special in Sub Saharan Africa because it faces acute problems of land 
scarcity and declining soil fertility. In addition, the period we cover was characterized by 
war and genocide. Unrest started in Rwanda at the end of 1990, when the RPF (Rwandan 
Patriotic Front) started launching attacks from Uganda. Intermittent hostilities and 
negotiations resulted in a power sharing agreement between the government and the 
RPF. But on April 6, 1994 the plane carrying President Habyarimana was shot down. 
Thereafter, Rwanda sunk away in chaos. Within hours, the military, administrators, the 
Interahamwe militia and ordinary people started to kill Tutsi, moderate Hutu and Hutu 
leaders from political parties rival to the president’s party, the MRDN. Simultaneously 
the war between the Rwandan army and the RPF was restarted. An important fraction of 
the population took refuge in neighboring countries. Late in May the killing and the war 
came to an end. The balance made up after the events was shocking: an estimated 
800,000 Tutsi killed, two million people displaced and more than 100,000 prisoners 
suspected of participation in the genocide (Des Forges, 1999)
 1. There have been multiple 
conflicts in Africa, but the scale of the violence in Rwanda was unprecedented.  
 
One of the causes of the civil war and a structural problem typical for Rwanda and 
neighboring Burundi was the alarming increase in population density and land scarcity
2.  
According to population censuses in 1978 Rwanda￿s population stood at 4,85 million 
people, while by 1991 it had risen to 7,17 million. This means that within a time span of 
13 years the population density had increased from 192 to 283 people per square km. As 
a consequence of war and genocide, the World Bank (2002) estimated that by the end of 
1994 the Rwandan population density had dropped to 247 habitants per square km. 
However, in the aftermath of the genocide population increased again at a fast pace. The 
population census of 2002 reports a density of 322 inhabitants per square km (SNR, 
2003)
3. Since an estimated 90% of Rwanda￿s population depends on agriculture, 
increasing land scarcity implies a decrease of economic opportunities, especially so as 
demographic pressure apparently did not lead to a wide adoption of agricultural 
innovations (Clay, 1996; Platteau, 2000)
4.   2
 
Against the background of these structural problems and of the violence of the nineties, 
we raise the question how Rwandan rural households manage. Studies comparing the 
pre-war with the post-war situation in Rwanda are still scarce and do not agree on the 
trend of poverty
5. The trend of increasing inequality is less contested (Government of 
Rwanda, 2002; Piron and McKay 2004). But, despite the overall trend of poverty and 
inequality, some households must do better than others. It is interesting to know which 
households have managed to improve their income position and which ones have 
remained poor or fell into poverty. Specific questions we try to answer are: How did the 
shocks of genocide, civil war and their aftermath affect the income position of 
households? What were the strategies of households who improved their income? And 
what were the characteristics of households who fell (deeper) into poverty?  
 
We try to answer these questions using a panel data set of 189 rural Rwandan households 
for the years 1990 and 2002. The data set starts from a survey carried out by Rwanda￿s 
Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MINAGRI) in 1990-91. Our colleague Philip 
Verwimp (2003) was able to trace most households in that survey in three Rwandan 
provinces (￿prefectures￿). Data on the economic activities of these households in two of 
these provinces were collected in 2002. The panel data make it possible to analyze 
income mobility over a period covering the civil war and the genocide. Although income 
mobility studies are still in their infancy, there are some interesting country studies that 
illustrate the potential richness of economic mobility analysis
6. This approach allows us 
to quantify the movement of the households through the income distribution and to 
relate households￿ mobility experiences to various determinants.  
 
We structure our analysis as follows. In section two we present our data sources. We 
describe the data collection process, highlight the advantages and disadvantages of our 
data set, discuss attrition bias in our sample and explain how we measure household 
welfare. In addition we present summary measures of some of our data. In section three, 
we use two approaches to describe income mobility, the ordinary (Pearson) correlation 
coefficient and the inter-temporal transition matrix. Based on these measures, we offer 
insight in the extent of income movement of Rwandan peasant households between 
1990 and 2002. In section four we present some preliminary hypotheses on the relation 
between variables linked to violence, land scarcity, household strategies and income gains   3
and losses. We illustrate these hypotheses by statistics describing the relation between 
these variables and the (change in) income ranking of households. In section five we use 
regression analysis to analyze systematically the factors that had an impact on income 
mobility between 1990 and 2002. We find that shocks mattered and that strategies to 




2.1. The data set 
In principle, the panel data set for this analysis covers 256 rural households. We have two 
time observations, the first spanning the crop season from October 1989 through March 
1990, the second spanning the same crop season 12 years later, from October 2001 
through March 2002
7. From now onwards, we refer to the two periods as 1990 and 2002.  
The 1990 data come from a national farm survey carried out by the Division of 
Agricultural Statistics (DSA) of Rwanda’s Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock 
(MINAGRI)
8. This survey was based on a nationwide random sample of approximately 
1,248 farm households. The survey was geographically stratified in clusters of 16 
households. It provided data on output, area and yields and information on topics such 
as livestock, non-farm income, household composition and schooling. 
 
In 1999 and 2000, Philip Verwimp (2003) tried to trace the same households of the 1990 
survey in three provinces (￿prefectures￿) of central and southwest Rwanda: Gitarama, 
Kibuye and Gikongoro, with 160 households (10 clusters) in the first and 96 (6 clusters) 
in each of the latter two provinces
9. At the time he collected mainly demographic data. 
He was able to trace 155 out of 160 households in Gitarama, all 96 households in 
Gikongoro and 89 out of 96 households in Kibuye. ￿Tracing￿ did not mean that all 
households still existed. Information on some households was obtained indirectly, e.g. 
from neighbors. 
 
The data on economic activities were collected in the February and March of 2002 as 
part of a study for the Belgian Department for Development Cooperation (DGOS) 
under the Policy Research Program. Because of financial constraints, the collection of 
economic data was limited to two provinces. The province of Kibuye was dropped   4
because in Kibuye the tracing exercise had been somewhat less successful than in 
Gikongoro and Gitarama provinces. In these two latter provinces, the faith of 251 out of 
256 households is known, though only 212 of the 256 households could be physically 
located. Therefore the 2002 survey covered 212 out of the 256 households in the 1990 
survey. These households were located in 16 different clusters in the two provinces. 
Each of these clusters was located in a different administrative sector. Annex 1 shows the 
sectors’  location. 
 
Our data set is unique as it is the only available household panel data set on Rwanda that 
includes information for the same households relating to the period before and after the 
highly turbulent years of civil war and genocide. In 2000-2001 the Department of 
Statistics of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, MINECOFIN, in 
collaboration with the World Bank, UNDP, UNICEF, DFID and ADB, implemented 
the Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey (IHLCS). This survey has a much 
wider coverage than ours (6450 households countrywide against 212 in two provinces in 
our survey). The main aim of the IHLCS was to obtain a detailed poverty profile as a 
base for policy measures, later formulated in the PRSP (Government of Rwanda, 2002). 
But this survey did not include (retrospective) questions on the extent of shocks suffered 
during war and genocide
10. Therefore it does not contain information on the shocks 
suffered by households as a result of war, genocide and their aftermath and does not 
permit an analysis of their impact which is one of the purposes of this paper.  
 
2.2. Attrition 
From the 256 households in the survey in Gikongoro and Gitarama provinces, 44 (17%) 
had dropped out by 2002
11. Important reasons for the high dropout were the genocide of 
1994 and the subsequent displacement of the population
12.  
 
Of the 212 remaining households, 13 could not be considered as "the same" households, 
because the head in 2002 was not a member of the household in 1990. For ten of the 
remaining 1999 households, some crucial variables were missing in the 1990 data set. The 
panel data set we eventually use comprises complete data on 189 households that could 
be identified in both years, meaning that the household head in 2002 was a member of 
the household in 1990.  
   5
An attrition level of 23% (57 out of 246 households with complete information in 1990) 
may seem high, but it is in line with expectations when taking into consideration the 
turbulent history of Rwanda between 1990-2002. Nevertheless the omission of 57 
households may cause attrition bias. Attrition bias occurs when ￿lost￿ households differ 
systematically from remaining ones.  
 
Table 1 compares some household characteristics of the 189 households included in our 
panel data set with those of the 57 households that had dropped out. We tested the 
difference between these characteristics by regressing them on an attrition dummy 
variable and a constant. We found that households that had dropped out, had on average 
in 1990 a smaller household size, an older household head, a lower value of livestock, a 
smaller contribution of income from livestock to household income and a somewhat 
smaller farm size than the households in our panel data set. Other characteristics did not 
differ significantly. 
 
Table 1: Data of households in panel data set and households that had dropped out, 1990 
  189 households of the 
PCRHS  
57 = 44 not traced + 13 
not "the same" 
Average household size  5.4  4.4** 
Average adult equivalenta   4.8                   4.0 
Average age of household head  46  51** 
% female-headed households  17.5%  23.6% 
Average dependency ratio
b  1.09 1.10 
Average number of TLU
 c  0.95 0.58 
Average land ownership (hectare)  0.96 ha  0.78 ha* 
Average income per adult equivalent (1990 
prices) 
10,797 RWF  9,634 RWF 
Average income per capita  9,584 RWF  7,706 RWF 
Average share of subsistence crops in income  58.5%  61.9% 
Average share of cash crops in income  6.6%  6.7% 
Average share of livestock in income  8.1%  4.1%** 
Average share of beer brewing in income  7.6%  11.3% 
Average share of off-farm work in income  19.2%  16.0% 
 The difference is *significant at 10%, **significant at 5% 
RWF=Rwandan Franc 
a The adult equivalent is based on the calorie needs of household members, depending on their age and sex. 
The reference is an adult, aged 20-39 years. We took the same values as those used in the IHLCS 
(MINECOFIN, 2002). 
bDependency ratio=(number of dependent/number of active household members). In the case were there 
were no active, the ratio equals 1. 
c Tropical Livestock Unit 
 
It is not straightforward to predict how the attrition in our sample influences the results 
of our income mobility analysis. We attempt to make one prediction. It is probable that a 
large proportion of the households that dropped out of the sample did not end up in an   6
enviable situation, as they could well have been affected by the massacre of 1994 or by 
the subsequent displacement of population. The sudden loss of household members or 
the forced migration probably reduced their welfare in a wide sense. It is also likely to 
have reduced their income
13. Therefore, we suspect that the dropout of households 
results in an upward bias of average income in the 2002 sample. It probably also biases 
downwards the number of households that suffered sharp income losses. This may affect 
our analysis of the determinants of income mobility. Indeed, leaving out households that 
had to cope with severe income reducing shocks is expected to bias downwards the 
estimated effect of shocks on income. When discussing our results of income mobility, 
we should keep this in mind. 
 
2.3. Measuring income  
Ideally we would like to study changes in welfare over time. But welfare is a 
multidimensional concept; it depends not only on access to tangible private or public 
goods and services but also on political and social rights. The scope of this paper is 
material welfare. Changes in material welfare over time can be measured by income or 
expenditures. Expenditures are the preferred measure of material welfare. But because of 
lack of data on expenditures we use income as a measure of household welfare.  
 
The use of income rather than expenditures as a welfare measure is likely to overstate the 
extent of economic mobility. There are two reasons for this. First, households try to 
smooth consumption over time. To the extent that households succeed in this attempt, 
the use of income overstates economic mobility. The ability of households to smooth 
consumption - and thus the extent of the overstatement - depends on the presence of 
well functioning credit and insurance systems (Ravallion, 1988)
 14.  
 
Second, income tends also to be more volatile than consumption because of 
measurement error. The difficulty lies in accounting correctly for the value of production 
for subsistence. So some of the measured income mobility in our sample may be the 
result of measurement error. For a thorough discussion of the effect of measurement 
error in income mobility studies, we refer to McCulloch and Baulch (2000). 
 
In addition, the fact that we work with income of the season from October till March of 
the following year instead of yearly income is also likely to inflate observed income   7
mobility. For example, Dercon and Krishnan (2000) find high seasonal variability in 
income and poverty in rural Ethiopia.  
 
The income of a household is calculated per adult equivalent
15. To measure income, we 
asked questions on five different income sources: subsistence agriculture, crop sales, beer 
brewing, livestock production and off-farm earnings. On average, in our survey 
subsistence agriculture was good for 41% of total income in 2002, compared to 59% in 
1990. 
 
The income from crop sales increased from 7 to 18%. A large part of the rise was 
probably the result of the favorable weather conditions in 2002 that resulted in a good 
harvest. This stands in sharp contrast with 1990, a poor crop year in which the southern 
part of Rwanda (Gikongoro foremost) was recovering from a crop failure
16. The harvest 
was so poor that few crops could be marketed. In 2002, harvests were very good
17.  
 
Besides land, the most important asset for Rwandan rural households is livestock. Both 
in 1990 and in 2002 31% of the households possessed cattle. Including small livestock, 
the percentage of households owning livestock was about 60% in both years. The 
contribution of livestock to income increased from 8 to 10%
18.  
 
Both in a social and an economic sense, beer brewing is an important activity in rural 
Rwanda. A part of the beer is consumed by the household members or offered as a gift 
on social occasions, another part is sold. The share of beer brewing in income remained 
at about 7%.  
 
Rural households increasingly add to their livestock and agricultural income by off-farm 
labor. Earnings from off-farm labor amounted to 19% of total income in 1990 and 25% 
in 2002. Within this category we distinguish between agricultural wage labor, low-skilled 
non-farm labor (e.g. construction work) and high-skilled non-farm labor (e.g. public 
servant)
19. Almost all of the 6%-increase is explained by the increased contribution of 
low-skilled non-farm earnings. In the face of increased land scarcity, the access to non-
farm jobs is expected to be an important determinant of income mobility.  
   8
We calculated gross income by taking the sum of the monetary value of subsistence 
agriculture, crop sales, beer brewing, livestock holdings and off-farm work. We did not 
have satisfactory data on the use of farm inputs such as seeds and fertilizer. However, we 
could calculate the cost of hiring casual labor and of the inputs needed for beer 
brewing
20. We subtracted these from gross income to obtain an approximation of net 
income.  
 
To calculate monetary values of subsistence agriculture and livestock, we used prices at 
the provincial level. For beer and crop sales, we could use the prices reported by the 
household
21. Between 1990 and 2002, the general price level rose by a factor of three. 
Thus, to obtain income in prices of 2002, we multiplied the income of 1990 by three.  
 
2.4. Comparison of survey data for 1990 and 2002 
Table 2 summarizes some of our panel data. We observe that the average net income per 
adult equivalent increased. The increase was mainly accounted for by one administrative 
sector (Kigoma) that suffered from a poor crop year in 1990, but profited from an 
extraordinary banana harvest in 2002. 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics for season A, 1990 and 2002 
 1990  2002 
Household net income (RWF)  45,221  51,539 
Household net income per adult equivalent   10,797  11,810 
Household size  5.4  5.0 
Adult equivalenta  4.8 4.6 
Dependency ratiob  1,09 1,27 
Age of the household’s head  45.9  50.9 
Female-headed household  17.5%  42.3% 
Share of agricultural subsistence production  58.5%  40.8% 
Share of crop sale  6.6%  17.7% 
Share of beer brewing  7.6%  6.7% 
Share of livestock income  8.1%  9.8% 
Share of off-farm employment  19.2%  25.0% 
      Casual labor  9.5%  9.1% 
      Low-skilled non-farm  2.5%  8.2% 
      High-skilled non-farm  7.1%  7.7% 
Land size (hectare)  0.96  0.86 
Tropical Livestock Unit owned
 c  0.95 0.91 
Cattle owned  0.71  0.68 
Poverty head count
 d  66% 71% 
Gini coefficient of HH net income/ae  0.40  0.47 
a The adult equivalent is based on the calorie needs of household members, depending on their age and sex. 
The reference is an adult, aged 20-39 years. We took the same values as those used in the IHLCS 
(MINECOFIN, 2002). 
bDependency ratio=(number of dependent/number of active household members). In the case were there 
were no active, the ratio equals 1.   9
c Tropical Livestock Unit 
d We used the food poverty line which equaled 45,000 RWF (108$) per adult equivalent in 2001 (IHLCS, 
2002) 
Note: these descriptive statistics include 7 observations that we excluded from the regression analysis. See 
annex 5 for details. Without these observations the summary statistics change hardly: Income per adult 
equivalent becomes 10871 in 1990 and 11247 in 2002, and the Gini coefficient of inequality increases from 
0.40 in 1990 to 0.44 in 2002. 
 
Between 1990 and 2002 the dependency ratio has increased considerably. This is partly 
due to the fact that 10% of the households have a member in prison. Although the 
prisoners are adults, we counted them as dependent rather than active. In Rwanda it is 
common that family members and friends of a prisoner bring food on a weekly or two-
daily basis. For the prisoner’s household this implies a cost not only in terms of 
expenditure, but also in terms of time, especially when the prison is far from the 
household’s residence.  
 
One of the most striking evolutions is the increased number of female-headed 
households. Their proportion rose from 18% to 42%. This is explained by the fact that 
prisoners￿ wives have become household heads, but foremost by the high number of 
male casualties during war and genocide
22.  
 
We also note the increase of the Gini coefficient between 1990 and 2002. The income 
distribution has become more skewed. Concurrently the proportion of households below 
the poverty line in our sample increased from 66% to 71%. However these figures are 
instantaneous measures. They offer no information on the movement of households 
through the income distribution. The analysis of income mobility to which we now 
proceed, does so.  
 
3. Income mobility measurement 
 
Income mobility studies have two advantages compared with a static analysis of poverty 
and inequality. First, a static analysis does not provide information on the mechanisms 
behind a change in household relative or absolute income. For example, if poverty 
incidence is observed to increase, this might be due to new poor having joined the 
existing poor, or it might be the net outcome of a dynamic process whereby some people 
escaped poverty and others - a larger number - have become poor. In contrast, a dynamic 
analysis can distinguish between transient and permanent poverty. Second, income   10
mobility studies enable an analysis of characteristics that differentiate households that 
escape from poverty from those that remain poor. 
 
Income mobility can be measured in different ways. Overviews of income mobility 
measures can be found in Maasoumi (1998), Atkinson, Bourguignon and Morrison 
(1992), Fields (2001) and Amiel and Bishop (2003). In this section we present measures 
that quantify time dependence in our sample, i.e. they measure how a household￿s 
current economic position is determined by its position in the past. This will give us a 
grasp of the occurrence of transient and permanent poverty in our sample. The more 
households move through the income distribution, the lower the time dependence and 
the higher the proportion of transient in total poverty. The measures we present in this 
section are all based on income per adult equivalent. 
 
The simplest measure of time dependence is the ordinary (Pearson) coefficient of 
correlation between base period income and final period income. The closer the value of 
the correlation coefficient is to +1, the higher the positive time dependence; the closer it 
is to -1, the higher the negative time dependence there is. Perfect time-independence 
arises when a household￿s final period income is independent of its base period income. 
This corresponds to a correlation coefficient of zero. In our sample we find a coefficient 
of 0.04, which is very close to zero, indicating almost perfect time-independence.  
 
Another very common instrument to analyze time dependence is the inter-temporal 
transition matrix. In table 3, the rows of the 5 by 5 matrix correspond to the income 
quintiles of the base period and the columns to the corresponding income quintiles of 
the final period. The entries in the transition matrix indicate the fractions of households 
in the base period income quintile that ended up in a final period income quintile. 
Between brackets we give the absolute numbers. 
 
Table 3: Inter-temporal income quintile transition matrix (income/adult equivalent) 
    Income quintiles in 2002 
   1 2 3 4 5 
1  14% (5)  16% (6)  19% (7)  19% (7)  32% (12) 
2  16% (6)  29% (11)  26% (10)  18% (7)  11% (4) 
3  32% (12)  21% (8)  18% (7)  16% (6)  13% (5) 
4  24% (9)  16% (6)  18% (7)  29% (11)  13% (5) 
Income 
quintiles     
in 1989 
5  13% (5)  18% (7)  18% (7)  18% (7)  32% (12) 
Number of households between brackets   11
For example, element (1; 1) of the matrix indicates that 14% of households that belonged 
to the lowest income quintile in 1990 remained in that quintile in 2002. Element (1;5) 
shows that 32% of the poorest households in 1990 managed to climb up to the highest 
quintile in 2002. This suggests a lot of mobility among the poorest households. 
 
More generally in the case of perfect time independence - or, "perfect mobility" - every 
entry in the matrix would be equal to 20%. If perfect time dependence - "perfect 
immobility" - prevailed, each element on the principal diagonal would equal 100%. The 
percentages in the cells of the matrix are rather close to 20%, which suggests a high 
degree of time independence in our data set. 
 
From the transition matrix we can calculate the immobility ratio. This is the fraction of 
households that remain in the same quintile, i.e. the average of the elements on the 
diagonal. We obtain an immobility ratio of 24.4%, which is comparable with other 
findings that used income quintiles for the transition matrix. For example, Lanjouw and 
Stern (1993) used income quintiles for India and found an immobility ratio of 26%, also 
over a 12-year period.  
 
For ease of comparison, annex 2 provides an overview of the results of eight mobility 
studies. We added our results to a table taken from Baulch and Hoddinott (2000). All 
studies that use income as mobility measure, report immobility ratios within the range of 
23% and 26%
23. The result of our study fits within this range. But the mobility within our 
lowest quintile of 1990 is considerable higher than what is found in other studies. This 
demands for an explanation. 
 
In subsection 2.3 we gave three reasons why our measure of income mobility may 
overstate the actual economic mobility in our sample. These reasons were related to 
consumption smoothing, measurement error and the use of seasonal instead of yearly 
data. Another cause of the low immobility ratio in the sample may be attrition. Indeed, if 
especially the poorest households dropped out of the sample, the transition matrix may 
overstate the degree of upward mobility of the poor. 
 
On the other hand, we have very good reasons to expect that actual economic mobility is 
high in our sample. We offer three reasons. First, the time span is fairly long. The longer   12
the time span, the lower the correlation of income in the base and the final period. 
Second, the chaos of war and genocide disrupted the economic situation and might have 
offered chances to some households while destroying the opportunities of others. 
Finally, in developing countries in general and specifically in Rwanda, the contribution of 
agriculture to income is very high and agricultural output depends on varying weather 
conditions
24. Agricultural output and weather conditions differ across the different 
locations in our sample. To the extent that weather conditions are region specific, inter-
regional income mobility may explain an important part of total income mobility in the 
sample.  
 
The importance of weather conditions in our data set is reflected e.g. by the fact that six 
out of the 12 households that made the remarkable upward climb from the lowest to the 
highest income quintile lived in one particular sector, Kigoma. This sector suffered from 
famine in 1990, but had an extraordinary banana harvest in 2002
25. We argue that 
attrition and the particular change for Kigoma largely explains the high mobility for 
households of the lowest quintile in 1990. 
 
To strengthen the finding of much income mobility, we repeated the above analysis using 
an asset index. This index was constructed on the basis of the two most important assets 
of Rwandan rural households, livestock and land
26. The correlation of the change in 
income with the change in the asset index is 0.28. Therefore we do not expect the inter-
temporal asset mobility matrix to perfectly match the inter-temporal income mobility 
matrix
27. However, they may be expected to match to some degree.  
 
Table 4: Inter-temporal asset quintile transition matrix (a weighted sum of livestock and land per adult 
equivalent) 
    Asset quintiles in 2002 
   1 2 3 4 5 
1  41% (15)  27% (10)  19% (7)  3% (1)  11% (4) 
2  16% (6)  21% (8)  26% (10)  18% (7)  18% (7) 
3  24% (9)  34% (13)  11% (4)  21% (8)  11% (4) 
4  16% (6)  11% (4)  24% (9)  34% (13)  16% (6) 
Asset 
quintiles     
in 1990 
5  3% (1)  8% (3)  21% (8)  24% (9)  45% (17) 
Number of households between brackets 
 
Table 4 shows the results of the mobility analysis for the asset index. Note that the 
position of 40% of the households in the lowest and highest quintiles of 1990 was 
unchanged in 2002 (elements (1; 1) and (5; 5) in the matrix). So, time dependence for the   13
first and fifth asset quintiles is much higher than for the corresponding income quintiles. 
But for the other three quintiles the diagonal cells are closer to 20%. As a consequence, 
the immobility ratio remains fairly low, at 30.2%, compared to 24.4% for incomes. 
 
To sum up, both the correlation coefficient of household incomes in 1990 and 2002 and 
the income quintile transition matrix for those years reveal very low time dependence in 
our sample. The analysis of the asset quintile transition matrix confirms this finding. We 
can therefore safely conclude that there was considerable income mobility between the 
period before and after the war and the genocide in Rwanda. The poor did not 
necessarily remain poor, and a number of non-poor fell into poverty: 34 of the 
households originally below the poverty line succeeded in escaping poverty, while 44 
households that in 1990 were above the poverty line had become poor by 2002
28. As a 
result, the proportions of ￿permanent￿ and ￿transient￿ poverty were respectively 73% 
and 27% of total poverty in 1990, and 67% and 33% in 2002
29. 
 
4. Drivers of income mobility: preliminary analysis 
 
We argued that Rwanda stands out in Africa because of its high population density and 
its turbulent history. Before analyzing the determinants of income mobility using 
regression analysis in the next section, this section provides a preliminary analysis with 
respect to these two specific features of Rwanda. We provide data on the relationship 
between income movements and a number of variables linked to the shocks of war, 
genocide and their aftermath as experienced by individual households, and land scarcity 
as well as strategies to overcome this.  
 
For this purpose, we use the change in income ranking or positional income movement. 
We started out by ranking households in 1990 and in 2002 according to their income (per 
adult equivalent), starting by the household with the lowest income. We then computed 
the positional income movement, i.e. the difference between a household￿s income rank 
in 2002 and in 1990. For example, a household with rank ten in 1990 (i.e. the tenth 
poorest household) that climbed up to rank 40 in 2002, had an upward positional income 
movement of 30 places. In this section we use this positional movement as our measure 
of income mobility. In section 5 we will also consider absolute income changes between 
the two years under consideration.   14
4.1.  Shocks  
Our 2002 survey contains several indicators of shocks related to war and genocide. In 
table 5, we list human losses and violent deaths for all households and according to 
ethnicity. In table 6 we give summary data on other shocks. Table 7 then relates these 
shocks to our measure of positional income movement. 
 
Between 1990 and 2002 the households in our sample lost 181 family members, on 
average almost one member per household. Of these human losses, 34% occurred in 
1994, 27% died a violent death, and 86% of these violent human losses occurred in 1994. 
The data in table 5 show the well-known fact that especially the Tutsi population was the 
target of violence. On average, in 1994 a Tutsi headed household in our sample lost more 
than one member due to violence.  
 
Table 5: Average number of human losses per household (absolute number between brackets) 






Number of human losses, 1990-2002 
Number of human losses in 1994 
Number of violent human losses , 1990-2002 











1.25  (15) 
1.25 (15) 
Note: The numbers of observations of the second and third column do not add up to 189 because we have 
4 Twa households in our sample. 
 
When evaluating these shocks, it is essential to be aware of the consequences of attrition 
in our sample. Attrition for Tutsi-headed households amounts to 45% compared to 13% 
for Hutu-headed households. Therefore, it is very likely that the extent of human losses 
is biased downwards and that this bias is more pronounced for Tutsi-headed households. 
 
In addition to human losses households lost a lot of physical capital during the war and 
the genocide. Table 6 shows that more than 50% of all cattle lost between 1991 and 2002 
were lost in 1994. One out of twenty households in the sample lost their house in 1994 
due to destruction by assailants. These losses of physical capital were again more severe 
for Tutsi-headed households
30. For example, more than half of Tutsi-headed households 
lost their house in 1994.  
 
Table 6: Other shocks related to war and genocide (absolute number between brackets) 





(12)   15
Average cattle lost, 1990-2002  0.72 (136)  0.64 (111)  2.08 (25) 
Average cattle lost in 1994  0.37 (70)  0.32 (55)  1.25 (15) 
Average violent cattle loss, 1990-2002  0.41 (78)  0.36 (63)  1.25 (15) 
Average violent cattle loss, 1994  0.31 (59)  0.28 (48)  0.92 (11) 
% Destruction of house, 1994  5.8% (11)  2.3% (4)  58.3% (7) 
% Prisoner (2002)  9.5% (18)  9.8% (17)  0 
% Refuge abroad (1994-2002)  15.9% (30)  17.3% (30)  0 
Note: the observations of the second and third column do not add up to 189 because we have 4 Twa 
households in our sample. 
 
Two shocks were more common among Hutu-headed households: taking refuge abroad 
and imprisonment. Over the period 1994-2002 16% of sample households had taken 
refuge for one or several months, sometimes even for years. Almost 10% of households 
had a member in prison in 2002. All households in our sample that had taken refuge 
abroad or that had a member in prison were Hutu-headed 
 
We now relate shocks experienced by households to positional income movement. In 
table 7 we provide data on the average rank change for households that experienced a 
specific shock and for households that did not. We also check whether the link between 
the shock and the change in rank was statistically significant. This was done by 
constructing a dummy variable for each shock and regressing the change of income rank 
separately on each dummy variable. Of course the shortcoming of this procedure is that 
it does not take into account simultaneously all shocks as well as other variables that 
could have had an impact on income rank changes. We will do this in section 5.  
 
Table 7: Shocks and positional movement (income/adult equivalent) 
Average change in rank  Difference  Event (between brackets: the number of observations) 
     Yes No   
Lost more than 1 member in ’94 (11)  -10 +1      -11 
The HH became female-headed between ’90-’02 (54)  -26 +10      -36*** 
The HH’s house was destroyed between ’90-’02 (36)  -18 +4      -22 
The head of the HH in prison after ’94 (17)  -41 +4      -45** 
HH took refuge for more than 3 months (20)       -4  0      -4 
Moved to another administrative sector after ‘94 (10)  -11 +1      -12 
The difference is significant *at 10%, **at 5%, *** at 1% 
Between brackets the number of households affected by the shock 
Note: these descriptive statistics include 7 observations that we excluded from the regression analysis. See 
annex 5 for details. Without these observations the summary statistics change considerable for the first and 
third row. The difference of the rank change for the first row becomes ￿28 instead of ￿11, though it 
remains insignificant. The difference for the third row becomes ￿26 and significant at the 10% level.   
 
Table 7 summarizes our results. All shocks included in table 7, are negatively related to 
income rank movement. The largest difference in rank change is found for households 
whose head was in prison and for households that became female-headed between 1990   16
and 2002, as many as 28.6% of households in the 2002 survey became female-headed. 
For Tutsi-headed households the percentage was 67.7% and for Hutu-headed 
households 25.4%.  
 
4.2. Land scarcity and strategies to overcome it  
Rwanda is struggling with two major structural problems: land scarcity and land 
degradation. We argue that Rwandan peasant households have two options to deal with 
land scarcity and land degradation. First, they can increase land productivity, either by 
using better or more inputs, either by turning to the market. This latter option supposes 
that farmers cultivate a limited range of crops with a high yield and exchange these on 
the market for other crops they like to consume. Second, households may increasingly 
rely on non-farm earnings to complement for their decreasing farm incomes. Table 8 
shows the average positional movement of households that did (or did not) experience a 
substantial amount of land loss and of households that did (or did not) adopt specific 
strategies to raise their income. It also indicates whether the difference between their 
positional movements was statistically significant, using the same test as was used for 
table 7. 
 
Table 8: Strategies to overcome land scarcity and positional movement (income/adult equivalent) (for 189) 
Event Average  change 
in rank 
Difference 
 Yes  No   
Substantial loss of land, 1990-2002 (47)a  -17 +5  -22* 
Use of fertilizer, 2002 (18)  +15  -1  +16 
Migration, 2002 (35)b  +35 -7  +43*** 
Increased contribution of high-skilled non-farm labor, 1990-2002 (28)  +50  -9  +59*** 
Increased contribution of low-skilled non-farm labor, 1990-2002 (38)  +36  -9  +45*** 
Increased contribution of agricultural wage labor, 1990-2002 (43)  +14  -4  +18 
Increased contribution of beer brewing, 1990-2002 (71)  -6  +4  -10 
Increased contribution of livestock, 1990-2002 (82)  -7  +4  -13 
Increased contribution of crop sale, 1990-2002 (127)  +2  -5  +7 
Increased contribution of subsistence, 1990-2002 (49)  -42  +14  -56*** 
The difference is significant *at 10%, **at 5%, ***at 1% 
Between brackets the number of households concerned. 
a  A household is said to have lost a substantial area of land if the households is part of the quartile of 
households that lost most land. 
b Migration is a dummy that equals 1 when at least one member of the households migrated in order to 
find employment. 
 
Table 8 shows that households with a substantial loss of land had a statistically significant 
negative positional income movement. Households using fertilizer moved on average 15 
places up, compared to an average loss of one place for the other households, but the   17
difference is not statistically significant. Households with one or more migrants (mostly 
to Kigali) experienced on average upward mobility. The difference with non-migrant 
households is significant. However we cannot draw conclusions from this finding on the 
impact of migration since the causality is not clear: migration may be a successful coping 
strategy leading to upward mobility but upward mobility may also produce the necessary 
means for migration. Table 8 also shows that increases in non-farm high-skilled and low-
skilled labor were associated with positive changes in income ranking. With respect to 
income composition, it appears that households that substituted subsistence agriculture 
with other income sources experienced upward income movement. Again, the causal link 
is not a priori clear; causality may be from change in income ranking to change in the 
contribution of subsistence agriculture to household income. Therefore in the regression 
analysis in section 5, we instrument for the income strategies.  
 
In the previous section, we briefly mentioned that many households from Kigoma sector 
managed to escape from poverty. There are other sectors that stand out with an 
exceptionally good or poor record of positional movement. We provide some detail on 
the location specific pattern of income positional movement in annex 3. 
 
5. Drivers of income mobility: regression analysis 
 
This section studies the factors that drive the income movement of households in our 
panel data set. The dependent variable is the change of log real income
31. Subsequently 
we also use the change of income rank as defined in the previous section, since it 
provides a nice way of interpreting the results. We present eight regression equations. 
 
The first two equations, (I) and (II), explain income movement as determined by capital 
in the base year income, the change of capital between 1990 and 2002, shocks at the 
household level, the altitude of the administrative sector and its distance to the market. 
The explanatory variables are described in detail in table 9. Annex 4 lists the mean and 
standard deviation of all variables. 
 
I.  DlogYi = f(capital90i , Dcapitali , shocksi , altitudei  , distM90i) 
II.  DrankYi = f(capital90i , Dcapitali , shocksi , altitudei  , distM90i) 
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Regressions (III) and (IV) analyse the effect of the same determinants on the change of 
two specific sources of income, income from crop sale and income from non-farm 
employment (respectively DlogYCS i  and  DlogYNFi). 
 
III.  DlogYCS i = f(capital90i , Dcapitali , shocksi , altitudei  , distM90i) 
IV.  DlogYNFi = f(capital90i , Dcapitali , shocksi , altitudei  , distM90i) 
 
In section 4, we argued that households have two ways to deal with land scarcity: 
increasing land productivity and turning to non-farm employment. Increasing land 
productivity can be realized due to the use of more or better inputs, or by producing the 
crops with the highest yield and exchanging them on the market for other crops. We lack 
good data on the use of inputs, but we can use crop selling by the household to account 
for the second possibility. To make sure we are not just capturing the marketing of 
occasionally agricultural surpluses, we use altitudei to control for varying weather 
conditions across the 16 different locations in our sample
32.  
 
Table 9: Description of explanatory variables 
Explanatory variables 
Category Symbol.  Description 
Capital90i HHSIZE90  Household  size,  1990 
  DEPRAT90  Dependency ratio, 1990 (dependent/active members)a 
  AGEH90  Age of head, 1990 
  YEDUCH90  Years of education head, 1990 b 
 FEMH90  Dummy  female-headed,  1990  
 TUTSIH  Tutsi-headed  household 
  LLANDS90  Log of Land size, 1990 (ha) 
Dcapitali DHHSIZE  ∆ Household size 
 DDEPRAT  ∆ Dependency ratio 
 DAGEH  ∆ Age of head c 
 DYEDUCH  ∆ years of education head c
 DFEMH  ∆ to male (-1) or female head (+1) c 
 DLANDS  ∆ Land size d 
Shocksi  VIOLENTL90-02  Number of members lost due to violence, 1990-2002 
  HHMOVED94-02  Household moved to another sector after 1994 
  HDESTR90-02  House destroyed, 1990-2002 
  PRISON02  Household member in prison, 2002 
  NMREFUGE94-02  Number of months the household took refuge, 1994-2002 
Altitudei     ALT  Altitude (meter), at the sectoral level 
DistMi  DISTM90  Distance to market (km) in 1990, at the sectoral level 
a Prisoners are counted as dependents 
b We converted the answers on no, completed or in-completed primary, secondary or tertiary education 
into years of education 
c In 53 cases, the household head changed over time. Instead of taking a dummy for the change of the 
household head, we chose to include three characteristics that changed, the household head‘s age, 
education and sex.  
d For the change in land size to be exogenous, we left out changes due to market transactions such as land 
sold or purchased, and rented land.  Important remaining causes of land size changes are inheritance, land 
loss due to erosion. 
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While these latter two equations do provide a nice comparison with equations (I) and 
(II), they may fail to detect an income strategy change. Indeed, a household may 
experience a rise or fall of all its income sources at the same time. Therefore, we perform 
a similar regression explaining the changing contribution of respectively crop sale and 
non-farm earnings to income. 
 
V.  DshareCS i = f(capital90i , Dcapitali , shocksi , altitudei  , distM90i) 
VI.  DshareNFi = f(capital90i , Dcapitali , shocksi , altitudei  , distM90i) 
 
In a final stage, we want to assess the effect of an income strategy change on the 
household￿s income movement. Since the income strategy change is endogenous, we use 
an instrumental variable estimation (IVE). Equations (V) and (VI) are the equations of 
the first-stage IV regressions, where the base-period variables (capital90i) are the excluded 
instruments. Equations (VII) and (VIII) below represent the second-stage IV regressions, 
with the changing contribution of crop sale and non-farm earnings instrumented. 
 
VII.  DlogY i = f(IDshareCS i , IDshareNF i , Dcapitali , shocksi , altitudei , distM90i) 
VIII.  DrankY i = f(IDshareCS i , IDshareNF i , Dcapitali , shocksi , altitudei , distM90i) 
 
If the base period variables (capital90i) are important in determining income change, (VII) 
and (VIII) are misspecifications. Therefore we also report results that include 
instrumented base period income, IlogY90i and IrankY90i,  arguing that base period 
income should effectively substitute for leaving out capital90i . Comparing table 11 with 
annex 7, we find that the results are hardly different. 
 
In a small data set like ours, a single observation that is substantially different from all 
other observations can make a large difference in the results of the regression 
analysis. That is why we looked for unusual and influential observations in our data. We 
used five criteria and excluded observations that were recognized as unusual or very 
influential according to three out of the five criteria. Annex 5 lists more details on the 
criteria and results. At the end of this exercise, we dropped seven out of the 189 
observations. Consequently, the regression results are based on 182 observations.  
 
For equations (I) to (VI) we used the Breush-Pagan and the White test for 
heteroskedasticity in the error distribution (Breusch, Pagan, 1979; White, 1980). When 
the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity was rejected, we based our inferences on the   20
Hubert/White robust standard errors. For equations (VII) and (VIII) we used the test of 
Pagan and Hall (1983), designed for detecting heteroskedasticity in the case of 
instrumental variable estimation. To test the validity of our instruments, we performed 
the Sargan and the C- or ￿difference-in-Sargan￿ test (Sargan, 1958; Baum et al., 2003) for 
overidentifying restrictions. A comprehensive discussion of tests in the IV framework is 
provided by Baum et al. (2003). Our results are reported in tables 10 and 11. 
 
Table 10: Explaining income movement 
Dependent variable   Change of log 
income 
Change of income 
rank 
Change of log 
income from crop 
sale 
Change of log 
income from non-
farm 
Explanatory variables  (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV) 
HHSIZE90  0.121 (3.01)***  4.653 (1.77)*  0.236 (1.15)  0.411 (1.47) 
DHHSIZE  0.084 (2.38)**  3.541 (1.53)  -0.015 (-0.08)  0.012 (0.05) 
DEPRAT90  -0.219 (-2.42)**  -11.176 (-1.89)*  0.178 (0.38)  -0.162 (-0.26) 
DDEPRAT  -0.147 (-3.23)***  -10.461 (-3.51)***  -0.047 (-0.20)  -0.146 (-0.46) 
AGEH90  -0.002 (-0.37)  -0.131 (-0.31)  0.005 (0.16)  -0.033 (-0.75) 
DAGEH  -0.007 (-1.25)  -0.180 (-0.48)  -0.007 (-0.24)  -0.007 (-0.18) 
YEDUCH90  0.007 (0.23)  -0.294 (-0.14)  -0.083 (-0.50)  -0.250 (-1.11) 
DYEDUCH  0.087 (2.58)**  3.781 (1.71)*  -0.128 (-0.74)  -0.147 (-0.62) 
FEMH90  -0.273 (-1.35)  -5.903 (-0.45)  1.273 (1.23)  -2.584 (-1.83)* 
DFEMH   -0.367 (-2.33)**  -20.878 (-2.03)**  -0.342 (-0.42)  -1.877 (-1.70)* 
LLANDS90  -0.238 (-2.77)***  -17.809 (-3.17)***  0.203 (0.46)  -1.125 (-1.87)* 
DLANDS  0.113 (1.14)  3.703 (0.57)  0.049 (0.10)  0.863 (1.24) 
TUTSIH  -0.074 (-0.25)  -14.746 (-0.74)  -1.974 (-1.27)  3.602 (1.70)* 
HHMOVED94-02   -0.344 (-1.03)  -39.435 (-1.81)*      -3.397 (-1.99)**  -0.712 (-0.30) 
HDESTR90-02  -0.380 (-2.25)**  -21.985 (-1.98)**  -0.847 (-0.98)  -1.209 (-1.02) 
PRISON02  -0.717 (-3.20)***  -43.004 (-2.94)***  -1.853 (-0.74)  -4.255 (-2.72)*** 
VIOLENTL90-02  -0.187 (-1.67)*  -8.792 (-1.20)  -0.592 (-1.03)  -2.170 (-2.77)*** 
NMREFUGE94-02  -0.004 (-1.04)  -0.131 (-0.52)  -0.015 (-0.77)  -0.043 (-1.61) 
ALT   0.001 (5.06)***  0.087 (4.68)***  0.004 (2.81)***  0.003 (1.30) 
DISTM90  -0.228 (-4.51)***  -15.683 (-4.74)***  -0.812 (-3.13)***  -0.482 (-1.36) 
Intercept  -1.545 (-2.48)**  -72.876 (-1.79)*  -3.336 (-1.05)  -0.707 (-0.16) 
R†  47% 45% 21% 21% 
Breush-Pagan test  Chi-sq (1)           
P-value = 0.388 
Chi-sq (1) 
P-value = 0.331 
Chi-sq (1)  
P-value = 0.445 
Chi-sq (1)      
P-value = 0.293 
Breush-Pagan test  Chi-sq (20)     
 P-value = 0.233 
Chi-sq (20) 
P-value = 0.514 
Chi-sq (20)    
P-value = 0.257 
Chi-sq (20) 
P-value = 0.676 
White test  Chi-sq (181)  
P-value = 0.465 
Chi-sq (181)   
P-value = 0.465 
Chi-sq (181)   
P-value = 0.465 
Chi-sq (181) 
P-value = 0.465 
T-vaues between brackets 
Significant at the *10% level, ** 5% level, *** 1% level 
 
In table 10, the shocks HHMOVED94-02, HDESTR90-02, PRISON02, 
VIOLENTL90-02 and NMREFUGE94-02 have the expected negative sign in all 
equations. The estimated coefficient of NMREFUGE94-02 is not significant in any of 
the equations. The estimated coefficients of the other shocks are significantly negative in 
at least two out of the four equations. From equation (II), we note that some of the 
shocks are associated with large decreases of income rank. For example, a household   21
with a member in prison fell 43 places in the income distribution. PRISON02 and 
VIOLENTL90-02 had a highly negative effect on non-farm earnings.  
 
Many of these shocks are correlated with each other and with DFEMH and TUTSIH. 
We present a correlation matrix in annex 6. The coefficient on DFEMH is negative and 
statistically significant in three out of the four regressions. Even when controlling for 
other shocks, regression (II) indicates that households that became female-headed 
between 1990 and 2002 lost on average 21 places in the income ranking.  
 
Since the genocide targeted mainly Tutsi, we expect that Tutsi-headed households 
experienced more downward mobility than Hutu-headed households did. We find that, 
although the estimated coefficient for TUTSIH is negative in equations (I)-(III), it is not 
significant. This result cannot be explained by the fact that we control for shocks that are 
highly correlated with ethnicity. Indeed, even the correlation matrix in annex 6 does not 
show significant negative correlation between ethnicity and income movement. However, 
attrition bias may explain part of this result: 45% of Tutsi-headed households of the 
original sample dropped out compared to 20% of Hutu-headed households. Another 
explanation arises from equation (IV), where the coefficient for TUTSIH is positive and 
significant. It is plausible that some Tutsi-headed households increased their non-farm 
earnings in the post-war period, since after the genocide a considerable number of Tutsi 
were elected for positions in the local administration
33.  
 
Besides the shocks of war and genocide, we are interested in the effect of land scarcity. 
Regressions (I) and (II) show a significant negative sign of LLANDS90, implying that on 
average households with smaller land sizes in 1990 climbed upward in the income 
distribution. Although, both in 1990 and 2002, the land-poor were poorer in income 
terms than the relatively land-rich, the smaller landowners of 1990 managed to bridge 
part of the gap. The means to bridge this gap came from the non-farm sector. Indeed, 
according to the results of regression (IV), especially the smaller landowners increased 
their non-farm income.  
 
Finally we mention the results for ALT and DISTM90. The altitude in our sample varies 
between 1400 and 2300 meters. Kigoma, the sector performing exceptionally well, lies at 
2300 meter. In general, the sectors at a higher altitude profited from a good harvest in 
2002 compared to 1990. This is reflected in the significantly positive coefficient of ALT   22
in regressions (I) to (III). DISTM90 is negative and significant in the first three 
regressions. Households living in sectors close to a market in 1990 expanded their 
income from crop sale considerable more than other households
34. We note that only 
one household-level variable (HHMOVED94-02) is significant in regression (III). The 
change of crop sales appears to be mainly driven by favourable weather conditions and 
easy access to a market, while household characteristics play an insignificant role. 
 
We now turn to regressions (V)-(VIII). In regression (V) we find again that it are mainly 
variables at the sectoral level that determined the changing contribution of crop sales to 
income. In regressions (VI), explaining the changing contribution of non-farm earnings 
to income, the estimated coefficients of PRISON02 and VIOLENTL90-02 are highly 
negative and significant. In addition, as was also evident from table 10, we find that 
especially small landowners increasingly depend on the non-farm sector to complement 
their farm income. 
 
Further we point out that AGEH90, YEDUCH90, FEMH90 and DFEMH have a 
negative and significant coefficient in regression (VI). Households with older heads, 
female-headed households and households that became female-headed between 1990 
and 2002, experienced a decreased contribution of non-farm earnings to income. 
Households with less educated heads may have seen an opportunity to expand the 
contribution of non-farm earnings to income thanks to an increased demand for low-
skilled non-farm labor. Remember from table 2 that the contribution of low-skilled non-
farm work increased from 2.5 percent in 1990 to 8.2 percent in 2002.  
 
We performed a similar regression explaining the changing contribution of subsistence 
agriculture to income. The results are opposite to what we find for regressions (V) and 
(VI): AGEH9, DAGEH, DFEMH, PRISON02, VIOLENL90-02, NMVLUCHT94-02 
and DISTM9 have a positive significant sign, while the estimated coefficient for ALT is 
significantly negative. 
 
Regression (VII) and (VIII) were designed to capture the effect of an income strategy 
change on the income movement of households. So far, we noted that the contribution 
of crop sales to income was mostly determined by ALT and DISTM90. Therefore we 
can hardly speak of an income strategy change at the household level with respect to 
crop sales. Controlling for ALT and DISTM90 in (VII) and (VIII), we do not find a   23
significant effect of IDSCROPS on income mobility. However, when DISTM90 is part 
of the excluded instruments, the estimated coefficient of HDSCROPS becomes positive 
and significant. We reported this result in annex 7. We conclude that household 
characteristics play a minor role in the decision to market crops, but, given a good 
harvest, the access to markets is crucial for turning the agricultural surplus into a profit.  
 
Table 11: Explaining income strategy change and assessing its effect on income movement 
Dependent variable   Change of share of 
crop sale in total 
income 
Change of share of 
non-farm in total 
income 
Change of log 
income 
Change of income 
rank 
Explanatory variables  (V)  (VI)  (VII)  (VIII) 
IDSCROPS       0.035 (1.19)  2.672 (1.37) 
IDSNONF       0.028 (2.86)***  1.727 (2.67)*** 
HHSIZE90  0.331 (0.39)  1.155 (0.79)     
DHHSIZE  -0.743 (-1.08)  -2.134 (-1.53)  0.132 (2.53)**  7.966 (2.27)** 
DEPRAT90  -1.544 (-0.77)  -2.613 (-0.88)     
DDEPRAT  -0.116 (-0.09)  -0.182 (-0.13)  -0.129 (-3.12)***  -9.078 (-3.27)*** 
AGEH90  0.006 (0.04)  -0.458 (-2.06)**     
DAGEH  0.006 (0.05)  -0.260 (-1.28)  -0.003 (-0.56)  -0.012 (-0.03) 
YEDUCH90  0.606 (0.83)  -2.114 (-1.89)*     
DYEDUCH  0.095 (0.14)  -0.678 (-0.59)  0.092 (2.61)***  4.435 (1.88)* 
FEMH90  9.672 (1.88)*  -17.678 (-2.34)**     
DFEMH  2.748 (0.75)  -10.581 (-2.23)**  -0.153 (-0.91)  -10.101 (-0.89) 
LLANDS90  1.012 (0.68)  -7.019 (-2.47)**     
DLANDS  0.682 (0.58)  4.821 (0.90)  -0.047 (-0.38)  -5.927 (-0.71) 
TUTSIH  -8.399 (-1.35)  15.986 (1.42)  -0.093 (-0.25)  -14.793 (-0.59) 
HHMOVED94-02  -8.108 (-1.04)  -5.071 (-0.47)  -0.046 (-0.10)  -10.662 (-0.35) 
HDESTR90-02  -0.505 (-0.15)  -6.520 (-1.18)  -0.176 (-0.86)  -8.988 (-0.65) 
PRISON02  -1.010 (-0.26)  -28.873 (-4.56)***  0.124 (0.34)  9.337 (0.38) 
VIOLENTL90-02  -0.870 (-0.36)  -11.081 (-3.16)***  0.195 (1.09)  13.713 (1.14) 
NMREFUGE94-02  -0.122 (-1.84)*  -0.113 (-0.66)  0.004 (0.65)  0.366 (0.88) 
ALT  0.040 (5.61)***  -0.000 (-0.00)  0.000 (0.00)  -0.016 (-0.21) 
DISTM  -5.137 (-5.30)***  -1.084 (-0.60)  0.001 (0.01)  -0.024 (-0.00) 
Intercept  -37.998 (-2.69)***  42.812 (1.96)*  -0.540 (-0.52)  -6.264 (-0.11) 
R† 34%  26%     
Breush-Pagan test  Chi-sq (1) 
P-value = 0.000 
Chi-sq (1) 
P-value = 0.004 
  
Breush-Pagan Chi-sq  (20) 
P-value = 0.052 
Chi-sq (20) 
P-value = 0.0224 
  
White test  Chi-sq (181) 
P-value = 0.465 
Chi-sq (181) 
P-value = 0.465 
  
Pagan and Hall test      Chi-sq (20) 
P-value = 0.999 
Chi-sq (20) 
P-value = 0.999 
Sargan test      Chi-sq (4) 
P-value = 0.122 
Ch-sq (4) 
P-value = 0.562 
C test for DLANDS      Chi-sq (1) 
P-value = 0.815 
Chi-sq (1) 
P-value = 0.660 
C test for DFEMH, 
DYEDUCH, 
DAGEH 
   Chi-sq  (3) 
P-value = 0.578 
Chi-sq (3) 
 P-value = 0.492 
T-vaues between brackets 
Significant at the *10% level, ** 5% level, *** 1% level 
Note: the inferences for regression (V) and (VI) are based on robust standard errors 
Note: The C-test is used to test the validity of a subset of instruments. We chose to test DLANDS because 
inheritance is a choice variable and could thus be endogenous. In addition we tested the combined validity   24
of DFEMH, DYEDUCH and DAGEH since these may be highly correlated with other unobserved 
characteristics of the new household head. 
 
In contrast, we found that several household characteristics determined the income from 
the non-farm sector. In regression (VIII), IDSNONF has a positive and significant effect 
on income movement. Increasing the contribution of non-farm earnings to income with 
one percent, leads on average to an upward mobility of almost two places in the income 
ranking.  
 
We performed a similar regression analysis using the instrumented changed contribution 
of agricultural subsistence to income. The results show that an increased contribution of 




Rwanda stands out in Africa due to two specific features. First, in 1994, the Rwandan 
population lived through a horrifying genocide. This resulted in human and material 
losses, an outflow of refugees and a high number of imprisoned presumed perpetrators 
of genocide. A second specific feature of Rwanda is its extremely dense population 
compared to African standards. Whereas most countries in Africa do by far not attain the 
population densities of Asian countries, Rwanda does with more than 300 inhabitants per 
square km. In addition to the immense challenge of reconciliation, Rwandan households 
have to find ways of surviving in the face of increasingly scarce natural resources. 
 
To get an insight in the impact of the shocks of war, genocide and their aftermath and in 
the impact of land scarcity and strategies to cope with it, we studied income mobility of a 
panel data set of 189 rural Rwandan households. Our data reveal increased income 
poverty and inequality, decreased land sizes and severe shocks of war and genocide at the 
household level.  
 
Between the years 1990 and 2002 we found considerable income mobility. As many as 
three out of four households had moved to another income quintile in 2002 compared to 
their starting position in 1990. Besides the effects of sample attrition and measurement 
error, we commented on other plausible reasons for the high mobility in our sample.   25
Most importantly, rural Rwandan households are confronted with cyclical agricultural 
setbacks. These may be very location specific, which explains why in certain 
administrative sectors many households experienced positive or negative income 
mobility. In addition, we studied income mobility in a turbulent period in which many 
households were affected by severe shocks.  
 
Our analysis revealed that one third of income poverty in our sample was transient rather 
than permanent. If harvest failure or other forms of temporary bad luck cause transient 
poverty, policymakers may implement smoothing policies to provide a safety net. 
Examples are improving access to insurance, and the creation of off-farm employment 
during harvest failure. 
 
Our analysis of determinants of income mobility has shown that downward income 
mobility was associated with the imprisonment of household members, change in the 
household head from a male to a female, and destruction of the family house. We found 
a weaker link between downward mobility and human losses, and no statistically 
significant link between downward mobility and the time taken refuge. We found upward 
income mobility for households that had reduced their dependence on subsistence 
agriculture. The increased contribution of non-farm earnings proved to be a successful 
strategy. Some of the land-poor in 1990 could bridge part of the gap with the land-rich 
by relying more on the non-farm sector.  
 
These results are not surprising given the high labor-land ratio in Rwanda. In the absence 
of land-augmenting innovations, a way to deal with land scarcity and soil degradation is 
the diversification of income sources. However not every household has equal 
opportunities in the labor market. Especially single-parent households are too time-
constrained to explore alternative economic opportunities. Households headed by 
women and households who lost (mostly) male active members due to the war or 
imprisonment were faced with a decrease of non-farm earnings. They failed to 
compensate for this loss and showed considerably downward mobility. If their situation 
is to be improved, specific policies targeting these groups are required. 
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1 Kagogwe  11  Kigoma 
2 Ngamba  12  Bitandara 
3 Ruyenzi  13  Nyarusange 
4 Gihembe  14  Kibirizi 
5 Mbati  15  Kamegeri 
6 Mbuye  16  Gorwe 
7 Ntenyo     
8 Gitovu     
9 Munanira     
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Annex 2: Summary of 10 transition matrices 
 
 
Table A.2. Summary of 10 transition matrices 
Percent of households that:  Percent of households in 














































Land 8  48.2  36.5  15.3  52.9  17.6  29.5 
Peru: Glewwe 
and Hall (1998) 
Expenditure 5  36.0  37.8  26.2  40.3  23.0  36.7 
South Africa: 
Maluccio et al. 
(2000) 
Expenditure 5  34.6  41.2  24.2  40.9  30.2  28.9 
Vietnam: World 
Bank, (1999) 
Expenditure 5  40.4  39.8  19.8  48.6  27.2  24.2 
Income 9 23.0  31.0  46.0  17.4  21.7  60.9 
Income  12 25.7  34.3  39.0 15.8  26.3 57.9 
India: Lanjouw 
and Stern (1991, 
1993)  Income 5 25.6  44.9  24.5  26.3  26.3  47.4 
Chile: Scott and 
Litchfield (1994) 
Income  18  23.3 39.0 37.7 8.0  32.0 60.0 
Income  12 24.4  29.1  46.6 13.5  16.2 70.3  Rwanda: present 
study   Asset index  12  30.2  37.6  32.2  40.5  27.0  32.4 
Source: Baulch and Hoddinott (2000) and our data from Rwanda for the last two rows   32
Annex 3: Regional diversity 
 
Income mobility has a very pronounced location specific pattern. Table A.3 illustrates the 
diversity. It reports for every administrative sector: mean base period income, the sector’s 
income rank in 1990, mean final period income, the sector’s income rank in 2002 and the 
average change in income rank for the households of the sector. The last column of the 
table gives the proportion of households in the sector that experienced positive 
positional income movement. 
 
Table A.3. Administrative sectors and positional movement 























% of HH in the sector 
experiencing positive 
positional movement 
Nyarusange  11,067  10 6,699 2 -14  33% 
Kamegeri  6,528 3 9,113  7  +30  70% 
Bitandara  8,656 5 9,594  8  +20  67% 
Kibirizi  5,338 2 8,399  4  +34  58% 
Gorwe  16,441  15 6,187 1 -64  10% 
Kigoma  5,228  1  26,829 16 +104  85% 
Gihembe  8,960 6 9,683  9 -15  50% 
Munanira  14,095 13  9,983 10 -17  50% 
Kagogwe  14,090 12 14,012  13  -6  39% 
Ngamba  13,633  11 6,734 3 -55  9% 
Ruyenzi  19,465 16 21,564  15  +7  50% 
Ruyengado 9,962  8 12,010  12 -22  23% 
Ntenyo  7,799 4 9,077  6 -10  54% 
Mbati  14,899 14 11,564  11 -28  23% 
Gitovu  10,108 9  8,476 5  -5  55% 
Mbuye 9,024  7  16,103  14  +27  62% 
 
We already mentioned that six of the twelve households that made most progress in 
income terms came from Kigoma sector. This sector suffered from a severe crop failure 
in 1990, but benefited from a very good harvest in 2002. Whereas the sector had the 
lowest mean income in 1990, it moved to the first position in 2002. 85%, or 11 out of 
the 13 interviewed households in Kigoma experienced positive positional income 
movement.  
 
Another eye-catching sector is Gorwe. In 1990 it was almost the richest sector (15
th 
place); in 2002 it became the poorest. The average positional movement was -64 places, 
while 90% of the interviewed households in Gorwe experienced negative positional 
movement. What is the story behind Gorwe? Gorwe is situated in an area where the   33
genocide was extremely severe. The shocks are evident from our data: only ten from the 
original 16 households remained in the sample, the 15 members of Tutsi households in 
the 1990 sample were all killed, four households out of the ten interviewed had a 
member in prison, six out of the ten took refuge. The dependency ratio increased from 
87 to 186. One of the reasons why the genocide was so severe was that the proportion of 
Tutsi in the population was fairly high compared to other parts of Gikongoro. It appears 
that the economic activities in the severely affected sector of Gorwe suffered a setback. 
The income source that decreased most in Gorwe is off-farm work. For further reading 
on the geographical pattern of the genocide in Gikongoro, we refer to Verpoorten 
(2004). More information on the reasons behind the income movement of sectors can be 
obtained from the authors on request. 
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Annex 4: Mean and standard deviation of explanatory variables 
Summary of dependent variables 
  Description  Mean   St. Dev. 
DlogY  Change in log income  -0.09  1.07 
DrankY  Change in income rank   0.00  69.00 
DlogYCS  Change in log income from crop sale  1.13  4.50 
DlogYNF  Change in log income from non-farm  -0.12  6.14 
DshareCS  Change of share of crop sale in total income  11.16  21.25 
DshareNF  Change of share of non-farm in total income  5.67  31.33 
 
Summary of continuous explanatory variables 
Symbol.  Description   Mean  St. Dev 
HHSIZE90 Household  size,  1990  5.41  2.26 
DHHSIZE  ∆ Household size  -0.41 2.56 
DEPRAT90  Dependency ratio, 1990 (dependent/active)  1.09  0.88 
DDEPRAT  ∆ Dependency ratio  0.49 1.95 
AGEH90  Age of head, 1990  45.47  14.68 
DAGEH  ∆ Age of head  5.77 14.62 
YEDUCH90  Years of education head, 1990  1.93  2.49 
DYEDUCH  ∆ years of education head 0.35 2.24 
LLANDS90  Log of land size, 1990 (ha)  -0.38  0.84 
DLANDS  ∆ Land size   -0.09  0.66 
VIOLENTL90-02  Number of members lost due to violence, 90-02  0.26  0.66 
NMREFUGE94-02  Number of months HH took refuge, 1994-2002  5.21  17.19 
ALT Altitude  (meter)  1741  239 
DISTM  Distance to market (km)  4.19  1.36 
 
Summary of discrete explanatory variables 
symbol Description    Value=1  Value=-1 
FEMH90 Dummy  female-headed,  1990  31   
DFEMH  ∆ to male (-1) or female head (+1) 51 5 
TUTSIH Tutsi-headed  household  12   
HHMOVED94-02  Household moved after 1994  8   
HDESTR90-02  House destroyed, 1990-2002  34   
PRISON02  Household member in prison, 2002  17   
 
Note: these summary statistics use the data of the 182 observations included in our regression analysis. 
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Annex 5: Unusual and influential observations 
 
 
We used five criteria to detect unusual and influential observations: 
1.  Income per adult equivalent < (mean income per adult equivalent ￿ 3* standard 
deviation of mean ) OR  income per adult equivalent > (mean income per adult 
equivalent + 3* standard deviation of mean ) 
2.  |studentized residual| > 2  
3.  leverage > (2k+2)/n    
4.  Cook’s D > 4/n 
5.  |DFITS| > 2*sqrt(k/n) 
(where k is the number of predictors and n the number of observations) 
 
For more details on these criteria, we refer to  
http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/webbooks/reg/chapter2/statareg2.htm 
 
Table A.5 below gives the number of observations recognized as unusual or influential 
according these criteria. 
 
Table A.5 
Criteria  1 2 3  4  5 
Number  of  ￿outliers￿  8 9 13 11 13 
 
If an observation is selected as unusual or influential in three out of five of these criteria, 
we left them out of the regression analysis of section 5. This is the case for seven 
observations. Leaving these observations out of the other sections does hardly influence 
the results of the descriptive statistics. For an example see the note below table 2. It does 
however change the results of table 7, below which we included a note for the important 
changes. 
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Annex 6: Correlation matrix of shocks, ethnicity and income movement 
 










TUTSIH 1.0        
DFEMH 0.223**  1.0       
HHMOVED94-02  -0.057  -0.001  1.0      
HDESTR90-02 0.270***  0.212**  0.035  1.0       
PRISON02 -0.085  0.142*  -0.069  0.040  1.0     
VIOLENTL90-02 0.400***  0.239** 0.120  0.090  -0.097  1.0   
NMREFUGE9402  -0.081  0.046  0.273***  -0.080 -0.005 -0.072 1.0 
DlogY -0.072  -0.283*** -0.076  -0.177**  -0.202**  -0.102  -0.061 
DrankY -0.103  -0.279*** -0.105  -0.180**  -0.190**  -0.100  -0.053 
Significant at the *10% level, ** 5% level, *** 1% level 
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Annex 7: Assessing the effect of income strategy change on income change 
 
Dependent variable   Change of log 
income 
Change of income 
rank 
Change of log 
income 
Change of income 
rank 
Explanatory variables  (IX)  (X)  (XI)  (XII) 
IDSCROPS   0.040 (1.19)  2.442 (1.32)  0.034 (3.50)***  2.676 (4.05)*** 
IDSNONF   0.031 (2.68)***  1.608 (2.56)***  0.027 (3.93)***  1.728 (3.67)*** 
ILOGY90  0.24  (0.87)     
IRANKY90   -0.122  (-0.62)     
HHSIZE90     
DHHSIZE  0.142 (2.37)**  7.967 (2.30)**  0.131 (4.12)***  7.972 (3.70)*** 
DEPRAT90      
DDEPRAT  -0.133 (-2.85)***  -8.769 (-3.34)***  -0.129 (-3.14)***  -9.078 (-3.28)*** 
A G E H 9 0       
DAGEH  -0.004 (-0.63)  -0.001 (-0.00)  -0.003 (-0.56)  -0.012 (-0.03) 
YEDUCH90      
DYEDUCH  0.104 (2.48)***  4.146 (1.85)*  0.092 (2.62)***  4.435 (1.88)* 
F E M H 9 0       
DFEMH  -0.129 (-0.67)  -10.542 (-1.00)  -0.153 (-0.94)  -10.095 (-0.92) 
LLANDS90      
DLANDS  -0.071 (-0.49)  -5.183 (-0.66)  -0.047 (-0.40)  -5.933 (-0.74) 
TUTSIH  -0.156 (-0.37)  -12.955 (-0.55)  -0.094 (-0.27)  -14.777 (-0.62) 
HHMOVED94-02  -0.098 (-0.18)  -15.165 (-0.52)  -0.048 (-0.13)  -10.628 (-0.41) 
HDESTR90-02  -0.200 (-0.86)  -8.352 (-0.65)  -0.177 (-0.89)  -8.981 (-0.67) 
PRISON02  0.155 (0.37)  8.209 (0.36)  0.123 (0.39)  9.364 (0.45) 
VIOLENTL90-02  0.215 (1.06)  13.087 (1.17)  0.194 (1.31)  13.727 (1.38) 
NMREFUGE94-02  0.004 (0.54)  0.368 (0.96)  0.004 (0.88)  0.366 (1.20) 
ALT  0.000 (0.04)  -0.016 (-0.22)  0.000 (0.03)  -0.016 (-0.50) 
DISTM  -0.015 (-0.08)  0.598 (0.06)     
Intercept  -3.112 (-0.98)  5.255 (0.08)  -0.545 (-0.68)  -6.172 (-0.11) 
Pagan and Hall test  Chi-sq (20) 
P-value = 1.000 
Chi-sq (20) 
P-value = 0.999 
Chi-sq (20) 
P-value = 0.842 
Chi-sq (20) 
P-value = 0.801 
Sargan test  Chi-sq (3) 
P-value = 0.171 
Ch-sq (3) 
P-value = 0.377 
Chi-sq (5) 
P-value = 0.198 
Ch-sq (5) 
P-value = 0.704 
C test for DLANDS  Chi-sq (1) 
P-value = 0.871 
Chi-sq (1) 
P-value = 0.805 
Chi-sq (1) 
P-value = 0.839 
Chi-sq (1) 
P-value = 0.708 




P-value = 0.171 
Chi-sq (3) 
 P-value = 0.377 
Chi-sq (3) 
P-value = 0.708 
Chi-sq (3) 
 P-value = 0.495 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 The death toll of the genocide remains a debated issue. In addition, tens of thousands of Hutu were killed 
or died from deprivation in refugee camps. 
 
2On land scarcity and unequal land distribution, leading to uneven development and violence see Mamdani 
(2001), Prunier, (1998), Newbury (1998), Uvin (1998), Verwimp, (2003). Other determinants of the 
genocide are the outbreak of civil war with the RPF invasion in October 1990 and the radicalisation of 
Hutu power politics in response to the perceived RPF threat, the creation  of opposition parties under the 
slow process of democratic liberalisation, and a feeling of Hutu inferiority that led to ethnic hatred and the 
extreme attempt to purge the ’Hutu nation’ of Tutsi (Baines, 2003). 
 
3 The most recent census of 2002 gave a population figure of 8.16 million inhabitants. The country’s 
surface was also re-estimated with the help of IMU/UNDP. Instead of 24738 km† as used in the data of 
the World Bank, the surface was calculated to be 25314 km† (SNR, 2003).  
 
4 This is in contrast to the prediction made by Boserup (1965), who argued that increased population 
density leads to innovations that temper to problem of land availability. It is somewhat difficult to measure 
land degradation. For documentation on this topic, we refer to Clay (1996) and the PRSP (Government of 
Rwanda, 2002). We do have detailed data on land sizes. In our own data set, average farm size decreased 
from 0.96 ha in 1990 to 0.86 ha in 2002. The number of households with less than 0.7 ha, the generally 
accepted minimum size needed to feed a household, increased from 57% in 1990 to 62% in 2002. 
 
5 Using household expenditure, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2002) finds that the proportion of 
people below the poverty line increased, from two out of five in the early 90’s to three out of five persons 
in 2002. However, Piron and McKay (2004) suggest the opposite based on information about agricultural 
production, household income and child malnutrition. The trend of increasing inequality is less contested 
(Government of Rwanda, 2002; Piron and McKay 2004). According to two nationwide surveys, the Gini 
coefficient of inequality rose from 0.29 in 1984/86 to 0.45 in 2000/2001 (MINECOFIN, 2002).  
 
6 For an overview of the theory and empirics of income mobility studies, see Fields (2001).  Examples of 
country studies are: Glewwe and Hall (1998), Randolph and Trzcinski (1989), Trzcinski and Randolph 
(1991), Scott and Litchfield (1994), Nee (1996), Nee and Liedka (1997), Chen and Ravallion (1996), Jalan 
and Ravallion (1998, 1999), Grootaert and Kanbur (1996), Grootaert, Kanbur and Oh (1997), Coondoo 
and Dutta (1990), DrŁze, Lanjouw, and Stern (1992).  
 
7 Rwanda has two seasons, the first, from October to March -season A- and the second from April to 
September - season B. Although, in 2002, we did collect data on the harvest of the preceding B season 
(April 2001-September 2001), we do not use them and work only with season A. The reasons for this are 
twofold. First, the data collection took place in February and March 2002, during the season A harvest, 
more than four months after the season B harvest. Since our season B data are based on recall, they might   39
                                                                                                                                           
be less trustworthy those for season A. A second reason for using only season A data is that for season B 
we did not ask questions on off-farm earnings and on income from beer brewing. The contributions of the 
different income sources may differ between the two seasons: season B is the main agricultural season and 
includes a long rainy period, season A is the less important agricultural season and includes a shorter rain 
period. Clay et al. (1997) however argue that the earnings from non-farm work remain more of less 
constant over the year. Yet, we chose not to extrapolate information on income sources from season A to 
season B.  
 
8 The exact name of the unit changed over time from ￿Service des EnquŒtes et Statistiques Agricoles￿ 
(SESA), to ￿Division des Statistiques Agricoles￿ (DSA), and most recently Food Security Research Project 
(FSRP), Division of Agricultural Statistics. The DSA and MINAGRI received assistance from the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) through a cooperative agreement with 
Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI) and Michigan State University. 
 
9 Reasons for choosing these provinces included among others the availability of information needed to 
locate the households, the mix of low and rather high survival rates of Tutsi during the genocide 
(respectively in Gikongoro and Kibuye on the one hand and Gitarama on the other), the presence of a 
sizable Tutsi population, an the mix of very poor and less poor administrative communes. See Verwimp 
(2003). 
 
10 Examples of such questions are whether, when and how household members were killed, and whether, 
when and where a household took refuge. The inclusion of such questions may have been too sensitive, as 
the answers would provide clues on the ethnicity of the household. In presentday Rwanda it is no longer 
politically correct to mention ethnicity. 
 
11 In 1999/2000 40 out of the 256 households in Gikongoro and Gitarama were not found. On 35 of these 
households Ph. Verwimp obtained information from neighbours. On 5 households there is no information 
at all. In 2002, four additional households could not be found. Thus in total we were not able to interview 
44 households out of a total of 256 or 17%. 
 
12 We know for example that among the households who dropped out, eight had been completely 
exterminated during the genocide. The war-related displacements can be divided into three broad 
categories. The first concerns widows of the genocide who, often the sole survivor of their household, 
went back to their birth area. The second category comprises survivors of the genocide who moved to 
houses constructed by the government, so-called imidugudu. Thirdly, war and genocide triggered a massive 
outflow of Rwandans to neighbouring countries. Many refugees did not return to Rwanda, others did, but 
not necessarily to the same place.  
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13 Further on in the text we provide a measure of the positional movement of households and we relate 
this to shocks. Our data suggest that households that suffered from shocks experienced on average more 
negative positional movement than other households. 
 
14 In our setting, household smooth consumption ex post mainly by selling assets, by taking up 
consumption credit and by drawing on their savings. Over the period of 12 years we found that on average 
annually 5% of households sold an asset to be able to reach their minimum food consumption. In the end 
period, 2002, 17% of households possessed some savings while 16% had taken credit. However, the 
strategies for income smoothing are far from perfect. As a consequence of negative shocks, many 
households had been forced to reduce the number of daily meals in several years between ’90 and ’02. The 
percentage of households in our sample reporting to have suffered food shortages fluctuated strongly 
across years, with a peak of 55% of households in 1994. 
 
15 The same analysis for income per capita did not lead to considerably different results. We used the adult 
equivalent scale as reported in the IHLCS (MINECOFIN, 2002), the large-scale Integrated Household 
Living Survey implemented in Rwanda in 2000-2001. 
 
16 The severe crop failure took place in season B of 1989. See P. Vewimp (2003). 
 
17 The larger contribution of crop sales to income may also have resulted from an increased specialization 
and intensification of the agricultural activities of some farmers. We refer to Berlage, Verpoorten, and 
Verwimp (2003).  
 
18 The increased contribution of livestock was due to higher income from cattle sales, resulting from an 
increase of the relative price of cattle. It is not clear how best to include livestock assets and production in 
income. Livestock is kept largely for manure. Since the use of manure raises the revenue from cropping 
income, its contribution to income is already included in subsistence output and crop sales. Livestock is 
not kept for home consumption. Most rural Rwandans are too poor to consume sizable amounts of meat, 
eggs or milk (Kangasniemi, 1998). However, selling livestock, eggs or milk livestock contributes to cash 
income. We have included the revenue from eggs, milk and livestock sales into account. Data on the 
revenue of the sale of eggs and milk exist for 1989/1990, but not for 2001/2002. We estimated the latter 
on the basis of the number of chickens and cows in 2001/02 applying a proportionality factor for the 
revenue of milk and eggs derived from the 1989/1990 data. Including the receipts from livestock sales in 
revenue is problematic because the number of livestock sold over such a short time span of one season is 
fairly small. The estimated income would be highly dependent on whether households happened to sell 
livestock during the 6 months of season A. An alternative approach is to assume that the income from 
livestock is proportional to the value of livestock holdings (Kangesniemi, 1998). We applied this method. 
The proportionality factor we use is the calculated average probability in the 2002 survey of selling 
livestock by type of livestock. 
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19 Off-farm jobs are jobs performed outside the family farm, be it in agricultural or non-agricultural 
activities. Examples are casual labor and construction work. Non-farm jobs belong to the non-agricultural 
sector, but can be performed on or outside the family holdings. Examples are pottery and construction 
work. 
 
20 Relying on the mid-point estimates for small beer brewers by Hagblade (1987) we assume that 3.41 
kilograms of bananas and 0.11 kilograms of sorghum are needed to produce one liter of banana beer and 
that 0.36 kilograms of sorghum are needed to brew one liter of sorghum beer. The inputs for beer 
consumption are subtracted from the category "agricultural subsistence production" in so far the 
household cultivated bananas and sorghum. The remainder of the inputs needed to account for the beer 
consumption and the inputs needed for beer sale are subtracted from the gross revenue of beer sale. 
 
21 We compared this with the use of provincial prices. With provincial prices for crop sales and beer sales, 
we obtained quite a lot of observations with negative net income from sale. So, in our case it seems that 
reported prices perform better because they can capture important intra-regional price differences. These 
differences might be due to the quality of the produce or the time of selling. 
 
22 59 widows (31%) and 6 wives of prisoners (3%) act as a household head in our sample. 
 
23 In developed countries, the immobility ratio is higher. Burkhauser, Holtz-Eakin and Rhody (1998) found 
an immobility ratio of 50.4% over five years for US income quintiles. Using expenditures instead of 
income increases the immobility ratio. In Peru, Glewwe and Hall (1998) reported that 36% of households 
remained in the same consumption expenditure quintile over a five-year period. Maluccio et al. (2000) 
found almost the same result for South Africa over the period 1993-1998.  
 
24 For a comprehensive overview of the climate and bio-diversity of Rwanda, we refer to Gotanegre, J. F. 
Prioul, C. Sirven, P. (1974) 
 
25 The particular situation of Kigoma is illustrated by the increased percentage of harvest sold. In 1990, 
only 5% of the harvest was sold compared to 84% in 2002. Anecdotal evidence is that when visiting the 
sector in 2002, many of the inhabitants were drunk in daytime. This was not a one-day event as our 
interviewer complained of night noise during her three-week stay in Kigoma. Drinking banana and 
sorghum beer is a popular activity in Rwanda and we suspect that people were spending their occasional 
surplus in feasting and drinking.  
 
26 We summed the tropical livestock units (TLU) and land size, both per adult equivalent. The land size 
was expressed in hectare and divided by 4, assuming that the value of 1 TLU corresponds to the value of 
0.25 hectare. Other important assets like schooling and social capital are difficult to quantify. 
 
27 The positive correlation between assets and income stems from two facts. First, the more physical capital 
the household possesses, the larger the base for income generating activities. Second, the more income the 
household has, the higher its capacity to invest in physical assets. However, we are not surprised that our 
asset index does not match income perfectly. Many factors besides land size and livestock, such as off-farm   42
                                                                                                                                           
earnings and land productivity determine the income level. Moreover, a household can invest its income 
also in schooling, migration or a small business. In addition, the choice to invest in the purchase of land 
and livestock is often constrained by the availability of land and pastureland.  
 
28 As stated in footnote to table 2, we used the food poverty line, which equalled 45,000 RWF (108$) per 
year per adult equivalent in 2001 (MINECOFIN, 2002).  
 
29 Using ￿permanent￿ and ￿transient￿ poverty here may be too strongly stated since we only have income 
data on two periods. These concepts would be more appropriate if we had expenditure data on several 
periods. 
 
30 The higher loss of cattle of Tutsi households is somewhat misleading because in the 1990 sample Tutsi 
households owned more cattle (on average 1.58) than Hutu households (1.04). 
 
31 The reason why we chose the change of log income as dependent variable is best illustrated by an 
example. In the table below, we have two households, A and B. Household A’s income over time increases 
from 100 to 200. In scenario 1, household B’s income increases from 1000 to 2000, while in scenario 2 it 
increases from 1000 to 1100.  
    1990 2002 Absolute  income 
change 
Change of log income 
  A  100 200 +100  +0.69 
Scenario  1  B 1,000 2,000 +1,000  +0.69 
Scenario  2  B’ 1,000 1,100 +100  +0.10 
In scenario 1 the relative income change of A and B is the same and the Gini coefficient does not change 
over time. In scenario 2, the absolute income change of A and B’ is the same and the Gini coefficient 
decreases over time, indicating less inequality. When you agree that in scenario 1 income inequality has not 
changed, you better use the change of log income to study income mobility since you value the income 
mobility of A and B as equal. When you rather think that inequality increased in scenario 1 and stayed the 
same in scenario 2, you better go along with absolute income change to measure mobility since you judge 
that the income movement of A and B’ are equal. Because most people would choose scenario one, we use 
relative income mobility for our analysis.  
 
32 Crop selling is not the ideal measure to detect a ￿market strategy￿. Many households sell immediately 
after the harvest out of necessity, often purchasing the same crop some time later at a higher price. Crop 
selling can also occur merely as a consequence of surpluses after a good crop season. One could argue that 
a better measure would be the share of land on which the household grows so-called cash crops. We 
cannot apply this measure to Rwanda. Almost all crops in our sample can be used both for consuming and 
selling. The only pure cash crop in our sample is coffee, but it is grown by a small fraction of farmers and it 
is increasingly abandoned due to price deterioration. In addition, we argue that the strategy in the face of 
land scarcity is not merely turning to the market, but rather cultivating the crops with the highest yield. 
This crop could be very different across households and locations.   43
                                                                                                                                           
33 The appointment of Tutsi in the local administration may not only have increased the non-farm earnings 
of Tutsi-headed households directly, but also indirectly due to better social networks for the access to non-
farm wage work. However, we do not have quantitative proof of such social networks, neither do we have 
extensive quantitative proof of the proportion of Tutsi in the local administration. During qualitative 
fieldwork in 2003 one of the authors noted that the ￿responsables￿ of the sectors she visited were 
￿rescapØs￿. Her translator explained that shortly after the genocide, in a climate of incrimination of many 
Hutu and feelings of guilt towards the Tutsi community, ￿rescapØs￿ were often appointed as ￿responsable￿ 
at the sector level. He explained that because people were pleased with their work and integrity, they voted 
for them during the grassroots elections at the cell and sector levels in March 1999. Human Rights Watch 
(New York, February 1, 2001) however criticizes the elections of March 1999: ￿There were few reports of 
irregularities, but the system itself inhibited free choice. Political party activity was prohibited and voters 
did not use secret ballots, as in elections under previous governments, but instead signified their vote by 
lining up publicly behind the candidates.￿ 
 
34 We have data on the distance to the market in 2002. In two sectors the distance to the market decreased 
between 1990 and 2002. However, in order to avoid endogeneity we use the distance to the market in 
1990. Indeed, if a sector expanded agricultural surplus and crop sales, local traders or authorities might 
react by constructing a market nearby. 